Related papers: Levy's zero-one law in game-theoretic probability

For gambling on horses, a one-parameter family of utility functions is proposed, which contains Kelly's logarithmic criterion and the expected-return criterion as special cases. The strategies that maximize the utility function are derived,…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…

We give a general method for constructing a deterministic strategy of Reality from a randomized strategy in game-theoretic probability. The construction can be seen as derandomization in game-theoretic probability.

This paper investigates two-player ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with McKean-Vlasov dynamics. We establish a verification theorem connecting solutions of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Master equations to Nash…

A new version of a Strong Law of Large Numbers is proposed in this note for pairwise independent random variables. The main goal is to relax the assumption on a finite expectation for each term.

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…

Simple stochastic games are two-player zero-sum stochastic games with turn-based moves, perfect information, and reachability winning conditions. We present two new algorithms computing the values of simple stochastic games. Both of them…

This note explains why a large class of fair, or reversible "money games", i.e., stochastic models of wealth redistribution among agents, lead to steady states described by canonical and microcanonical distributions. The games considered…

Shelah Spencer [ShSp:304] proved the 0-1 law for the random graphs G(n,p_n), p_n=n^{- alpha}, alpha in (0,1) irrational (set of nodes in [n]= {1, ...,n}, the edges are drawn independently, probability of edge is p_n). One may wonder what…

We establish a novel characterisation of the law of the convex minorant of any L\'evy process. Our self-contained elementary proof is based on the analysis of piecewise linear convex functions and requires only very basic properties of…

The expected utility hypothesis is a popular concept in economics that is useful for making decisions when the payoff is uncertain. In this paper, we investigate the implications of a fluctuation theorem in the theory of expected utility.…

In this paper, we study a theoretical math problem of game theory and calculus of variations in which we minimize a functional involving two players. A general relationship between the optimal strategies for both players is presented,…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

A zero-one language L is a regular language whose asymptotic probability converges to either zero or one. In this case, we say that L obeys the zero-one law. We prove that a regular language obeys the zero-one law if and only if its…

We prove central limit theorems, Berry-Esseen type theorems, almost sure invariance principles, large deviations and Livsic type regularity for partial sums of the form $S_n=\sum_{j=0}^{n-1}f_j(...,X_{j-1},X_j,X_{j+1},...)$, where $(X_j)$…

Let $\eta_i, i=1,..., n$ be iid Bernoulli random variables. Given a multiset $\bv$ of $n$ numbers $v_1, ..., v_n$, the \emph{concentration probability} $\P_1(\bv)$ of $\bv$ is defined as $\P_1(\bv) := \sup_{x} \P(v_1 \eta_1+ ... v_n…

We study multistep Bayesian betting strategies in coin-tossing games in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show that by a countable mixture of these strategies, a gambler or an investor can exploit…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

We consider "randomized" statistics constructed by using a finite number of observations a random field at randomly chosen points. We generalize the invariance principle (the functional CLT), the Glivenko--Cantelli theorem, the theorem…