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This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and…
We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…
In recent work, semantic games of independence-friendly logic were studied in strategic form in terms of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria. The class of strategic games of independence-friendly logic is contained in the class of win-loss,…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…
In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…
We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as…
This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
For a mean field game model with a major and infinite minor players, we characterize a notion of Nash equilibrium via a system of so-called master equations, namely a system of nonlinear transport equations in the space of measures. Then,…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…
We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…
We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an…
The centipede game is a two-player non-zero-sum game. Each turn, a player can choose whether they want to take or pass a growing reward. The classical, rational solution of this game shows defection in the first round, when in reality,…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…