Related papers: The norm game on a model network: a critical line

The Inspection Game is the canonical model for the strategic conflict between law enforcement (inspectors) and citizens (potential criminals). Its classical Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) is afflicted by a paradox: the equilibrium…

How cooperation evolves and particularly maintains at a large scale remains an open problem for improving humanity across domains ranging from climate change to pandemic response. To shed light on how behavioral norms can resolve the social…

The paper studies the problem of steering multi-dimensional opinion in a social network. Assuming the society of desire consists of stubborn and regular agents, stubborn agents are considered as leaders who specify the desired opinion…

The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

Prisoner's Dilemma is a game theory model used to describe altruistic behavior seen in various populations. This theoretical game is important in understanding why a seemingly selfish strategy does persist and spread throughout a population…

Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…

Network creation games are well-established for investigating the decentralized formation of communication networks, like the Internet or social networks. In these games, selfish agents that correspond to network nodes strategically create…

We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…

Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social system dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all…

Indirect reciprocity explains the evolution of cooperation by considering how our cooperative behavior toward someone is reciprocated by someone else who has observed us. A cohesive society has a shared norm that prescribes how to assess…

Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial…

We study a model of learning on social networks in dynamic environments, describing a group of agents who are each trying to estimate an underlying state that varies over time, given access to weak signals and the estimates of their social…

Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning…

Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…

Understanding the social determinants of preventive behavior is vital for epidemic modelling and effective policy making. Traditional models emphasize imitation or rational trade-offs, but recent evidence highlights the role of social…

We study opinion dynamics in a social network with stubborn agents who influence their neighbors but who themselves always stick to their initial opinion. We consider first the well-known DeGroot model. While it is known in the literature…