Related papers: A Quantitative Arrow Theorem
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity is a dictatorship. Wilson derived properties of constitutions satisfying Transitivity and…
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a…
Arrow's Theorem concerns a fundamental problem in social choice theory: given the individual preferences of members of a group, how can they be aggregated to form rational group preferences? Arrow showed that in an election between three or…
Arrow's theorem implies that a social choice function satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle (Unanimity) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are allowed, a dictatorial…
We propose a quantum voting system, in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. Our scheme enables a constitution to violate a quantum analog of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Arrow's Theorem is a claim proved…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem establishes bounds on what we can require from voting systems. Given satisfaction of a small collection of "fairness" axioms, it shows votes can only exist as dictatorships in which one voter determines all…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…
There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility…
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of…
Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. A choice function c is a mapping which assigns to nonempty subsets S of X an element c(S) of S. A rational choice function is one for which there is a linear ordering on the alternatives such that c(S)…
In this paper we study Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in the quantum setting. Our work is based on the work of Bao and Halpern, in which it is proved that the quantum analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is not valid. However, we feel…
Arrow's `impossibility' theorem asserts that there are no satisfactory methods of aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations. This result has ramifications in economics, politics, i.e., the…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
Voting is a game with a no-go theorem. New proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem are given based on quantum information theory. We show that the Arrowian dictator is equivalent to the perfect cloning circuit. We present…
This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the…
A central theme in social choice theory is that of impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to…
Preference aggregation is a fundamental problem in voting theory, in which public input rankings of a set of alternatives (called preferences) must be aggregated into a single preference that satisfies certain soundness properties. The…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…