Related papers: Discrete mean field games
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
This work is mainly concerned with the so-called limit theory for mean-field games. Adopting the weak formulation paradigm put forward by Carmona and Lacker, we consider a fully non-Markovian setting allowing for drift control and…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
This paper studies a discrete-time major-minor mean field game of stopping where the major player can choose either an optimal control or stopping time. We look for the relaxed equilibrium as a randomized stopping policy, which is…
In this paper, we study the portfolio optimization problem formulated by Lacker and Soret. They formulate a finite time horizon model that allows agents to be competitive, measuring their utility not only by their absolute wealth but also…
Mean field games model equilibria in games with a continuum of players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games with weak interaction between the players. We consider a finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with two cost criteria:…
The theory of Mean Field Game of Controls considers a class of mean field games where the interaction is through the joint distribution of the state and control. It is well known that, for standard mean field games, certain monotonicity…
This paper focuses on the role of a government of a large population of interacting agents as a mean field optimal control problem derived from deterministic finite agent dynamics. The control problems are constrained by a PDE of…
We investigate mean-field games (MFG) in which agents can actively control their speed of access to information. Specifically, the agents can dynamically decide to obtain observations with reduced delay by accepting higher observation…
Mean field games and controls involve guiding the behavior of large populations of interacting agents, where each individual's influence on the group is negligible but collectively impacts overall dynamics. Hybrid systems integrate…
We study stochastic Mean Field Games on networks with sticky transition conditions. In this setting, the diffusion process governing the agent's dynamics can spend finite time both in the interior of the edges and at the vertices. The…
This paper is concerned with a class of linear-quadratic stochastic large-population problems with partial information, where the individual agent only has access to a noisy observation process related to the state. The dynamics of each…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
For a number of important mean field games models, the Hamiltonian is non-local and not additively separable. This means that the distribution of agents appears in the Hamiltonian only in an integral over the whole spatial domain. For mean…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…
The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. In this paper, we introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems, and we study the convergence of this procedure to a solution of…
We present a new notion of solution for mean field games master equations. This notion allows us to work with solutions which are merely continuous. We prove first results of uniqueness and stability for such solutions. It turns out that…
Recent advances at the intersection of dense large graph limits and mean field games have begun to enable the scalable analysis of a broad class of dynamical sequential games with large numbers of agents. So far, results have been largely…