Related papers: On Framework and Hybrid Auction Approach to the Sp…
Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the…
This work proposes a novel hybrid RF/FSO system based on a game theoretic spectrum trading process. It is assumed that no RF spectrum is preallocated to the FSO link and only when the link availability is severely impaired by the infrequent…
In the context of increasingly complex environmental challenges, effective pollution control mechanisms are crucial. By extending the state of the art auction mechanisms, we aim to develop an efficient approach for allocating pollution…
Stochastic hybrid systems have received significant attentions as a relevant modelling framework describing many systems, from engineering to the life sciences: they enable the study of numerous applications, including transportation…
Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants: they propose prices at which they stand ready to buy and sell a wide variety of assets. They face a complex optimization problem with both static and dynamic components. They…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible consumers. In our model, each consumer is interested in a subset of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one good…
Today's cellular telecommunications markets require continuous monitoring and intervention by regulators in order to balance the interests of various stakeholders. In order to reduce the extent of regulatory involvements in the day-to-day…
As recommender systems are being designed and deployed for an increasing number of socially-consequential applications, it has become important to consider what properties of fairness these systems exhibit. There has been considerable…
Finding the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism to sell multiple items has been a prominent and notoriously difficult open problem. Existing work has mainly focused on deriving analytical results tailored to a particular class of…
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated…
Recently, joint advertising has gained significant attention as an effective approach to enhancing the efficiency and revenue of advertising slot allocation. Unlike traditional advertising, which allocates advertising slots exclusively to a…
We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private…
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so budgets are used for…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
The current electricity networks were not initially designed for the high integration of variable generation technologies. They suffer significant losses due to the combustion of fossil fuels, the long-distance transmission, and…
In this paper, we consider the problem of incentive mechanism design for smart-phone crowd-sourcing. Each user participating in crowd-sourcing submits a set of tasks it can accomplish and its corresponding bid. The platform then selects the…
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite…
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification. The framework captures various contexts such as school…
A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex preferences complicate…