Related papers: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Without Unanimity
Revised proofs of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem have been presented in prose form, incorporating novel ideas such as decisive sets and pivotal voters. This study develops another approach to proving the theorem. Using a proof…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…
Incomputability results in Formal Logic and the Theory of Computation (i.e., incompleteness and undecidability) have deep implications for the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Likewise, Social Choice Theory, a branch of…
It is shown that, since an ultrafilter over an operator-algebraically finite (i.e. isomorphic to the lattice of projectors of a finite Von Neumann algebra) quantum logic is not necessarily principal, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem doesn't…
We consider the social welfare function a la Arrow, where some voters are not qualified to evaluate some alternatives. Thus, the inputs of the social welfare function are the preferences of voters on the alternatives that they are qualified…
The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) ensures that the revealed preference (i) is a preference relation (i.e., it is complete and transitive) and (ii) rationalizes the choices. However, when WARP fails, either one of these two…
We generalize the Arrow's impossibility theorem--a key result in social choice theory--to the setting where the arity $k$ of the relation under consideration is greater than $2$. Some special but natural properties of $k$-ary relations are…
We critique the formulation of Arrow's no-dictator condition to show that it does not correspond to the accepted informal/intuitive interpretation. This has implications for the theorem's scope of applicability.
A classification is a surjective mapping from a set of objects to a set of categories. A classification aggregation function aggregates every vector of classifications into a single one. We show that every citizen sovereign and independent…
Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…
Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences…
We give a categorical account of Arrow's theorem, a seminal result in social choice theory.
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…
A group of individuals wishes to classify $m$ objects into $n$ categories in such a way that no class is left empty, a condition known as surjectivity. The opinions of the individuals are aggregated separately for each object using an…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that…
The classical Arrow's Theorem answers "how can $n$ voters obtain a collective preference on a set of outcomes, if they have to obey certain constraints?" We give an analogue in the judgment aggregation framework of List and Pettit,…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…
The "Modularity Conjecture" is the assertion that the join of two nonmodular varieties is nonmodular. We establish the veracity of this conjecture for the case of linear idempotent varieties. We also establish analogous results concerning…
In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning…