Related papers: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game in Rand…
Cooperative behaviors are deeply embedded in structured biological and social systems. Networks are often employed to portray pairwise interactions among individuals, where network nodes represent individuals and links indicate who…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
People participate and activate in online social networks and thus tremendous amount of network data is generated; data regarding their interactions, interests and activities. Some people search for specific questions through online social…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…
In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game…
In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but,…
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…
Models of cooperation grounded on social networks and on the ability of individuals to choose actions and partners aim to describe human social behavior. Extensive computer simulations of these models give important insight in the social…
Empirically derived continuum models of collective behavior among large populations of dynamic agents are a subject of intense study in several fields, including biology, engineering and finance. We formulate and study a mean-field game…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
In social dilemmas self-interested learning agents face the choice between the societal benefit of cooperation and the immediate reward of defection. Significant evidence exists on the benefits of assortment mechanisms such as partner…
Inspired by the local minority game, we propose a network Boolean game and investigate its dynamical properties on scale-free networks. The system can self-organize to a stable state with better performance than random choice game, although…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
We propose a strategy for achieving maximum cooperation in evolutionary games on complex networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter…
Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode…
This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related…
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…