Related papers: Almost stable matchings in constant time
We give a simple approximation algorithm for a common generalization of many previously studied extensions of the maximum size stable matching problem with ties. These generalizations include the existence of critical vertices in the graph,…
We study the Dominating set problem and Independent Set Problem for dynamic graphs in the vertex-arrival model. We say that a dynamic algorithm for one of these problems is $k$-stable when it makes at most $k$ changes to its output…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
In this work, we analyze the influence of a single strategic agent on the quality of the other agents' matchings in a matching market. We consider a stable matching problem with $n$ men and $n$ women when preferences are drawn uniformly…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
In this paper, we study the weighted stochastic matching problem. Let $G=(V, E)$ be a given edge-weighted graph and let its realization $\mathcal{G}$ be a random subgraph of $G$ that includes each edge $e\in E$ independently with a known…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
An edge-weighted, vertex-capacitated graph G is called stable if the value of a maximum-weight capacity-matching equals the value of a maximum-weight fractional capacity-matching. Stable graphs play a key role in characterizing the…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
We present deterministic distributed algorithms for computing approximate maximum cardinality matchings and approximate maximum weight matchings. Our algorithm for the unweighted case computes a matching whose size is at least $(1-\eps)$…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
The matching hypothesis in social psychology claims that people are more likely to form a committed relationship with someone equally attractive. Previous works on stochastic models of human mate choice process indicate that patterns…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley. In this paper, we provide a new upper bound on…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…