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Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-player non-zerosum stochastic games is a formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents…
We study the problem of deciding the winner of reachability switching games for zero-, one-, and two-player variants. Switching games provide a deterministic analogue of stochastic games. We show that the zero-player case is NL-hard, the…
We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…
We prove that finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant $\epsilon$ and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
Motivated by applications to data networks where fast convergence is essential, we analyze the problem of learning in generic N-person games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Specifically, we consider a scenario where…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
This work, based on the author's MA thesis, concentrates on simultaneous move quantum games of two players. A numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in…
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…