Related papers: Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project p…
We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) with joint feasibility constraints and expected-value cost functions. We propose a distributed stochastic projected reflected gradient algorithm and show its almost…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…
We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for the cooperative production of virtual products. In our model, a group of producers collaboratively produce a virtual product by contributing costly input resources to a production coalition.…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
We introduce the \emph{graphical reconfigurable circuits (GRC)} model as an abstraction for distributed graph algorithms whose communication scheme is based on local mechanisms that collectively construct long-range reconfigurable channels…
Among the many challenges of integrating renewable energy sources into the existing power grid, is the challenge of integrating renewable energy generators into the power systems economy. Electricity markets currently are run in a way that…
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many…
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…
This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes that agents evaluate…
An important part of the Smart Grid literature on residential Demand Response deals with game-theoretic consumption models. Among those papers, the hourly billing model is of special interest as an intuitive and fair mechanism. We focus on…
A sequential quadratic programming method is designed for solving general smooth nonlinear stochastic optimization problems subject to expectation equality constraints. We consider the setting where the objective and constraint function…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the…
This paper investigates risk measures derived from the expected maximum deficit in a continuous-time framework and develops optimal reserve allocation strategies across multiple lines of business. We formalize the expected maximum deficit…
I present a dynamic, voluntary contribution mechanism, public good game and derive its potential outcomes. In each period, players endogenously determine contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. The level of contribution…