Related papers: Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation

Quantitative information flow analyses measure how much information on secrets is leaked by publicly observable outputs. One area of interest is to quantify and estimate the information leakage of composed systems. Prior work has focused on…

Leakage errors arise when the quantum state leaks out of some subspace of interest, for example, the two-level subspace of a multi-level system defining a computational `qubit' or the logical code space defined by some quantum…

Developers rely on constant-time programming to prevent timing side-channel attacks. But these efforts can be undone by compilers, whose optimizations may silently reintroduce leaks. While recent works have measured the extent of such…

This paper presents a schedule randomization algorithm that reduces the vulnerability of real-time systems to timing inference attacks which attempt to learn the timing of task execution. It utilizes run-time information readily available…

Generating accurate runtime safety estimates for autonomous systems is vital to ensuring their continued proliferation. However, exhaustive reasoning about future behaviors is generally too complex to do at runtime. To provide scalable and…

Cache timing attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much information can actually leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our…

Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…

In recent times we hear increasingly often about cyber attacks on various commercial and strategic sites that manage to escape any defense. In this article, we model such attacks on networks via stochastic processes and predict the time of…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the…

We propose a computational framework to quantify (measure) and to optimize the reliability of complex systems. The approach uses a graph representation of the system that is subject to random failures of its components (nodes and edges).…

A new measure of information leakage for quantum encoding of classical data is defined. An adversary can access a single copy of the state of a quantum system that encodes some classical data and is interested in correctly guessing a…

Despite the critical role of timing infrastructure in enabling essential services, from public key infrastructure and smart grids to autonomous navigation and high-frequency trading, modern timing stacks remain highly vulnerable to…

The inevitable leakage of privacy as a result of unrestrained disclosure of personal information has motivated extensive research on robust privacy-preserving mechanisms. However, existing research is mostly limited to solving the problem…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

We introduce a privacy measure called pointwise maximal leakage, generalizing the pre-existing notion of maximal leakage, which quantifies the amount of information leaking about a secret $X$ by disclosing a single outcome of a (randomized)…

Despite numerous countermeasures proposed by practitioners and researchers, remote control-flow alteration of programs with memory-safety vulnerabilities continues to be a realistic threat. Guaranteeing that complex software is completely…

Games of timing aim to determine the optimal defense against a strategic attacker who has the technical capability to breach a system in a stealthy fashion. Key questions arising are when the attack takes place, and when a defensive move…

We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete Yahalom protocol, where timing information allows the study…

Timing attacks are considered one of the most damaging side-channel attacks. These attacks exploit timing fluctuations caused by certain operations to disclose confidential information to an attacker. For instance, in asymmetric encryption,…