Related papers: A characterization of 2-player mechanisms for sche…
Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a…
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the…
We present a causality-based algorithm for solving two-player reachability games represented by logical constraints. These games are a useful formalism to model a wide array of problems arising, e.g., in program synthesis. Our technique for…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of…
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players---the controller and the environment---by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of priced timed automata. The goal of the…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…
Two-player (antagonistic) games on (possibly stochastic) graphs are a prevalent model in theoretical computer science, notably as a framework for reactive synthesis. Optimal strategies may require randomisation when dealing with inherently…
Weighted timed games are two-player zero-sum games played in a timed automaton equipped with integer weights. We consider optimal reachability objectives, in which one of the players, that we call Min, wants to reach a target location while…
Stochastic automata are a formal compositional model for concurrent stochastic timed systems, with general distributions and non-deterministic choices. Measures of interest are defined over schedulers that resolve the nondeterminism. In…
In strategic classification, agents manipulate their features, at a cost, to receive a positive classification outcome from the learner's classifier. The goal of the learner in such settings is to learn a classifier that is robust to…
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…