Related papers: A characterization of 2-player mechanisms for sche…
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We investigate zero-sum turn-based two-player stochastic games in which the objective of one player is to maximize the amount of rewards obtained during a play, while the other aims at minimizing it. We focus on games in which the minimizer…
We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with…
If a two-player social welfare maximization problem does not admit a PTAS, we prove that any maximal-in-range truthful mechanism that runs in polynomial time cannot achieve an approximation factor better than 1/2. Moreover, for the k-player…
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. In…
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…
We present a unified framework for designing deterministic monotone polynomial time approximation schemes (PTAS's) for a wide class of scheduling problems on uniformly related machines. This class includes (among others) minimizing the…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of…
We study the problem of truthfully scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish unrelated machines, under the objective of makespan minimization, as was introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [STOC'99]. Closing the current gap of…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The…