Related papers: General Auction Mechanism for Search Advertising
Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in…
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand bidders…
Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions…
With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to determine how to place bids on the keywords of their interest in order to maximize their return for a given budget: this…
This article introduces a new approach to address the spectrum scarcity challenge in 6G networks by implementing the enhanced licensed shared access (ELSA) framework. Our proposed auction mechanism aims to ensure fairness in spectrum…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
Decision-making in large-scale games is an essential research area in artificial intelligence (AI) with significant real-world impact. However, the limited access to realistic large-scale game environments has hindered research progress in…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm…
While page views are often sold instantly through real-time auctions when users visit websites, they can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts. In this paper, we present a dynamic programming model to study how an online…
Consider a seller that intends to auction some item. The seller can invest money and effort in advertising in different market segments in order to recruit $n$ bidders to the auction. Alternatively, the seller can have a much cheaper and…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…