Related papers: The Player's Effect
We study in this paper three aspects of Mean Field Games. The first one is the case when the dynamics of each player depend on the strategies of the other players. The second one concerns the modeling of '' noise '' in discrete space models…
We analyze the domination game, where two players, Dominator and Staller, construct together a dominating set M in a given graph, by alternately selecting vertices into M. Each move must increase the size of the dominated set. The players…
We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players' private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of…
In a guessing game, players guess the value of a random real number selected using some probability density function. The winner may be determined in various ways; for example, a winner can be a player whose guess is closest in magnitude to…
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…
To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selfish player uses both the historical minority…
We present a simple model of Texas hold'em poker tournaments which retains the two main aspects of the game: i. the minimal bet grows exponentially with time; ii. players have a finite probability to bet all their money. The distribution of…
The paper is concerned with the dependence of the solution of the deterministic mean field game on the initial distribution of players. The main object of study is the mapping which assigns to the initial time and the initial distribution…
The purpose of this paper is to study 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, in which one player is a major one and the other player is a group of $N$ minor agents which are collectively playing, statistically identical and have…
Given a set of several inputs into a system (e.g., independent variables characterizing stimuli) and a set of several stochastically non-independent outputs (e.g., random variables describing different aspects of responses), how can one…
I propose a flexible structural model to estimate peer effects across various quantiles of the peer outcome distribution. The model allows peers with low, intermediate, and high outcomes to exert distinct influences, thereby capturing more…
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
We show that for any $\epsilon>0$, as the number of agents gets large, the share of games that admit a pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium converges to 1. Our result holds even for pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium in which all agents, except for at most…
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
Probabilistic properties of tennis scoring systems are examined and compared with best-of-K systems. A model, where each player has his/her own probability of winning his/her service point and which remains invariant for the duration of the…
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a powerful tool to probe the self-organisation of collective behaviour by considering frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary processes. It has shown that the stability of a strategy depends not…
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure {\epsilon}-equilibria, and pinpoint…
We define a notion of the criticality of a player for simple monotone games based on cooperation with other players, either to form a winning coalition or to break a winning one, with an essential role for all the players involved. We…
We consider the natural extension of two-player nonlocal games to an arbitrary number of players. An important question for such nonlocal games is their behavior under parallel repetition. For two-player nonlocal games, it is known that…
In set theory without the axiom of regularity, we consider a game in which two players choose in turn an element of a given set, an element of this element, etc.; a player wins if its adversary cannot make any next move. Sets that are…