Related papers: A Type System for Data-Flow Integrity on Windows V…

Synchronous reactive data flow is a paradigm that provides a high-level abstract programming model for embedded and cyber-physical systems, including the locally synchronous components of IoT systems. Security in such systems is severely…

Many important security properties can be formulated in terms of flows of tainted data, and improved taint analysis tools to prevent such flows are of critical need. Most existing taint analyses use whole-program static analysis, leading to…

Verifying integrity of software execution in low-end micro-controller units (MCUs) is a well-known open problem. The central challenge is how to securely detect software exploits with minimal overhead, since these MCUs are designed for low…

A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…

Trust is of paramount concern for tenants to deploy their security-sensitive services in the cloud. The integrity of VMs in which these services are deployed needs to be ensured even in the presence of powerful adversaries with…

Language models have shown remarkable proficiency in code generation; nevertheless, ensuring type correctness remains a challenge. Although traditional methods, such as constrained decoding, alleviate this problem by externally rejecting…

Through the increasing interconnection between various systems, the need for confidential systems is increasing. Confidential systems share data only with authorized entities. However, estimating the confidentiality of a system is complex,…

High-assurance security systems require strong isolation from the untrusted world to protect the security-sensitive or privacy-sensitive data they process. Existing regulations impose that such systems must execute in a trustworthy…

Static information flow control (IFC) systems provide the ability to restrict data flows within a program, enabling vulnerable functionality or confidential data to be statically isolated from unsecured data or program logic. Despite the…

We present Lifty, a domain-specific language for data-centric applications that manipulate sensitive data. A Lifty programmer annotates the sources of sensitive data with declarative security policies, and the language statically and…

This paper reports our experience of providing lightweight correctness guarantees to an open-source Rust OS, Theseus. First, we report new developments in intralingual design that leverage Rust's type system to enforce additional invariants…

Confidential computing is a key technology for isolating high-assurance applications from the large amounts of untrusted code typical in modern systems. Existing confidential computing systems cannot be certified for use in critical…

Flow-sensitive type systems offer an elegant way to ensure memory-safety in programming languages. Unfortunately, their adoption in new or existing languages is often hindered by a painful effort to implement or integrate them into…

Fault injections are increasingly used to attack/test secure applications. In this paper, we define formal models of runtime monitors that can detect fault injections that result in test inversion attacks and arbitrary jumps in the control…

Computer-based systems have solved several domain problems, including industrial, military, education, and wearable. Nevertheless, such arrangements need high-quality software to guarantee security and safety as both are mandatory for…

Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…

We present a type system capable of guaranteeing the memory safety of programs that may involve (sophisticated) pointer manipulation such as pointer arithmetic. With its root in a recently developed framework Applied Type System (ATS), the…

We show how support for information-flow security proofs could be added on top of the Verified Software Toolchain (VST). We discuss several attempts to define information flow security in a VST-compatible way, and present a statement of…

Gradually-typed programming languages permit the incremental addition of static types to untyped programs. To remain sound, languages insert run-time checks at the boundaries between typed and untyped code. Unfortunately, performance…