Related papers: Distributed authentication for randomly compromise…
We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to mitigate one of quantum key distribution's major limitations: the short maximum transmission distance (~200 km) possible with present day…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols rely on authenticated classical communication. Typical QKD security proofs are carried out in an idealized setting where authentication is assumed to behave honestly: it never aborts, and all…
In this work we review the security vulnerability of Quantum Cryptography with respect to "man-in-the-middle attacks" and the standard authentication methods applied to counteract these attacks. We further propose a modified authentication…
Existing security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) suffer from two fundamental weaknesses. First, memory attacks have emerged as an important threat to the security of even device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD),…
A general mathematical framework for quantum key distribution based on the concepts of quantum channel and Turing machine is suggested. The security for its special case is proved. The assumption is that the adversary can perform only…
Experimental Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have to consist of not only the unconditionally secure quantum transmission, but also a subsequent classical exchange that enables key reconciliation and error correction. There is a…
Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are expected to enable information-theoretical secure (ITS) communication over a large-scale network. Most researches on relay-based QKD network assume that all relays or nodes are completely…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely studied quantum cryptographic model that exploits quantum effects to achieve information-theoretically secure key establishment. Conventional QKD contains public classical post-processing…
In this paper we review and comment on "A novel protocol-authentication algorithm ruling out a man-in-the-middle attack in quantum cryptography", [M. Peev et al., Int. J. Quant. Inform., 3, 225, (2005)]. In particular, we point out that the…
Quantum networks rely on both quantum and classical channels for coordinated operation. Current architectures employ entanglement distribution and key exchange over quantum channels but often assume that classical communication is…
We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining a classical algebraic rewrite system for knowledge with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computing. As a test case, we use…
Quantum key distribution is widely thought to offer unconditional security in communication between two users. Unfortunately, a widely accepted proof of its security in the presence of source, device and channel noises has been missing.…
Key establishment is a crucial primitive for building secure channels: in a multi-party setting, it allows two parties using only public authenticated communication to establish a secret session key which can be used to encrypt messages.…
Quantum key distribution, which allows two distant parties to share an unconditionally secure cryptographic key, promises to play an important role in the future of communication. For this reason such technique has attracted many…
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is twice as long as the…
Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide information theoretically secure key exchange even in the era of quantum computer. However, QKD requires the classical channel to be authenticated, and the current method is pre-sharing symmetric…
The problem of security of quantum key protocols is examined. In addition to the distribution of classical keys, the problem of encrypting quantum data and the structure of the operators which perform quantum encryption is studied. It is…
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of…