Related papers: Properties and applications of dual reduction
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of…
We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under…
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…
Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent priors. This problem has been…
Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…
In this paper we use the minimax inequalities obtained by S. Park (2011) to prove the existence of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto Nash equilibria of a multiobjective game defined on abstract convex spaces.
For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…
The fundamental laws of quantum world upsets the logical foundation of classic physics. They are completely counter-intuitive with many bizarre behaviors. However, this paper shows that they may make sense from the perspective of a general…
In this paper, we study randomized reduction methods, which reduce high-dimensional features into low-dimensional space by randomized methods (e.g., random projection, random hashing), for large-scale high-dimensional classification.…
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular,…
We present a new methodology for computing approximate Nash equilibria for two-person non-cooperative games based upon certain extensions and specializations of an existing optimization approach previously used for the derivation of fixed…
Many resources are provided by an ecological system that is vulnerable to tipping when exceeding a certain level of pollution, with a sudden big loss of ecosystem services. An ecological system is usually also a common-pool resource and…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
We investigate an alternative concept of Nash equilibrium, m-equilibrium, which slightly resembles Harsanyi-Selten risk dominant equilibrium although it is a different notion. M-equilibria provide nontrivial solutions of normal form games…