Related papers: Automatic Verification of Correspondences for Secu…
Security protocols are used in many of our daily-life applications, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but they become so complex that…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
ProVerif is a widely used security protocol verifier. Internally, ProVerif uses an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses and a resolution algorithm on these clauses, in order to prove security properties of the protocol or…
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…
In the paper we introduce a process model of security protocols, where processes are graphs with edges labelled by actions, and present a new method of specification and verification of security protocols based on this model.
Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
In this paper, we present a new formal method to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of every component in the protocol and making sure that it does not…
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
A long-standing research problem in security protocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,…
We design and analyze new protocols to verify the correctness of various computations on matrices over the ring F[x] of univariate polynomials over a field F. For the sake of efficiency, and because many of the properties we verify are…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance. It is intended to augment existing postal voting procedures, allowing a ballot to be electronically constructed, printed on paper, then returned in the post. It allows…
This paper presents a new formal method for verification of quantum communication protocols. By extending the symbolic system of Petri nets, we can define quantum pure states in Petri-net settings. Therefore, it is possible to emerge a…
Numerous exploits of client-server protocols and applications involve modifying clients to behave in ways that untampered clients would not, such as crafting malicious packets. In this paper, we demonstrate practical verification of a…
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have…
Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol,…
Mature push button tools have emerged for checking trace properties (e.g. secrecy or authentication) of security protocols. The case of indistinguishability-based privacy properties (e.g. ballot privacy or anonymity) is more complex and…
The advancement of mobile and wireless communication technologies in recent years introduced various adaptive protocols to adapt the need for secured communications. Security is a crucial success factor for any communication protocols,…