Related papers: An Algebraic Characterization of Security of Crypt…
In this paper we propose a general definition of secrecy for cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model. We give a sufficient condition ensuring secrecy for protocols where rules have encryption depth at most two, that is satisfied by…
We suggest the usage of algebraic subsets instead of subgroups in public-key cryptography. In particular, we present the subset version of two protocols introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov with some examples in ascending HNN-extensions of…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
Security protocols are building blocks in secure communications. They deploy some security mechanisms to provide certain security services. Security protocols are considered abstract when analyzed, but they can have extra vulnerabilities…
The purpose of the paper is to give new key agreement protocols (a multi-party extension of the protocol due to Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld and a generalization of the Diffie-Hellman protocol from abelian to solvable groups) and a new…
Security protocols are used in many of our daily-life applications, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but they become so complex that…
We propose a general security definition for cryptographic quantum protocols that implement classical non-reactive two-party tasks. The definition is expressed in terms of simple quantum-information-theoretic conditions which must be…
This paper revisits formalizations of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols which are very fundamental primitives in cryptography. In general, we can formalize information-theoretic security…
Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol,…
Although recent advances of blockchain systems, notably in the form of cryptocurrency, have drawn tremendous interests from both researchers and practitioners, limited studies existed toward the theoretical foundation of blockchains. This…
We consider a problem, which we call secure grouping, of dividing a number of parties into some subsets (groups) in the following manner: Each party has to know the other members of his/her group, while he/she may not know anything about…
A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs . (phi…
We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in…
Most common public key cryptosystems and public key exchange protocols presently in use, such as the RSA algorithm, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve methods are number theory based and hence depend on the structure of abelian groups. The…
We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in…
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed…
This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…
We introduce what --if some kind of group action exists-- is a truly (information theoretically) safe cryptographic communication system: a protocol which provides \emph{zero} information to any passive adversary having full access to the…
We address a cryptanalysis of two protocols based on the supposed difficulty of discrete logarithm problem on (semi) groups of matrices over a group ring. We can find the secret key and break entirely the protocols.