Related papers: A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Schedulin…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
Ads on the Internet are increasingly sold via ad exchanges such as RightMedia, AdECN and Doubleclick Ad Exchange. These exchanges allow real-time bidding, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange ``calls out'' to…
In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency…
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized…
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…
In today's online advertising markets, a crucial requirement for an advertiser is to control her total expenditure within a time horizon under some budget. Among various budget control methods, throttling has emerged as a popular choice,…
In this work we introduce a new class of mechanisms composed of a traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction and a fair division scheme, in order to achieve some desired level of fairness between groups of Bayesian strategic…
Contemporary real-world online ad auctions differ from canonical models [Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2009] in at least four ways: (1) values and click-through rates can depend upon users' search queries, but advertisers can only partially…
Internet advertising is a sophisticated game in which the many advertisers "play" to optimize their return on investment. There are many "targets" for the advertisements, and each "target" has a collection of games with a potentially…
We study a game between autobidding algorithms that compete in an online advertising platform. Each autobidder is tasked with maximizing its advertiser's total value over multiple rounds of a repeated auction, subject to budget and…
Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance guarantees when the prediction is perfect (consistency), while…
A company provides a service at different time slots, each slot being endowed with a capacity. A non-atomic population of users is willing to purchase this service. The population is modeled as a continuous measure over the preferred times.…
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions with budget constraints. In each period, the decision maker needs to submit a bid to win the auction and maximize the total collected reward, subject to…
Sponsored search positions are typically allocated through real-time auctions, where the outcomes depend on advertisers' quality-adjusted bids - the product of their bids and quality scores. Although quality scoring helps promote ads with…
In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…
We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for…
In this work, we investigate online mechanisms for trading time-sensitive valued data. We adopt a continuous function $d(t)$ to represent the data value fluctuation over time $t$. Our objective is to design an \emph{online} mechanism…