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Since the invention of Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols have been proposed and some protocols are operated even in field environments. One of the striking features of QKD is that QKD…
Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners (NQSS) are key distribution protocols in which Alice encodes her key into $N-1$ qubits, in such a way that all the other partners must cooperate in order to retrieve the key. On these…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows Alice and Bob to share a secret key over an insecure channel with proven information-theoretic security against an adversary whose strategy is bounded only by the laws of physics. Composability-based…
All incoherent as well as 2- and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies on the 6 state protocol of quantum cryptography are classified. For a disturbance of 1/6, the optimal incoherent eavesdropping strategy reduces to the universal…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to establish a shared secret key that is secure against all-powerful adversaries. One such protocol named B92 is quite appealing due to its simplicity but is highly sensitive to channel…
We present an effective Eavesdropping scheme to attack the twin-field protocol of quantum key distribution [TF-QKD] proposed recently.
We experimentally demonstrate a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol using photon pairs entangled in orbit angular momentum (OAM). In our protocol, Alice and Bob modulate their OAM states on each entangled pair with spatial light…
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) can share secret keys by using less quantum resource than its fully quantum counterparts, and this likely makes SQKD become more practical and realizable. In this paper, we present a new SQKD protocol by…
An elementary derivation of best eavesdropping strategies for the 4 state BB84 quantum cryptography protocol is presented, for both incoherent and two--qubit coherent attacks. While coherent attacks do not help Eve to obtain more…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote users to establish a secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper. The users share quantum states prepared in two mutually-unbiased bases: one to generate the key while the other monitors…
Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol (Int. J. Quantum Inf, 18, 4, 2020) to help a quantum participant to share a secret key with a classical participant. However, this study shows that an…
We introduce a constructive method to calculate the achievable secret key rate for a generic class of quantum key distribution protocols, when only a finite number n of signals is given. Our approach is applicable to all scenarios in which…
If an eavesdropper Eve is equipped with quantum computers, she can easily break the public key exchange protocols used today. In this paper we will discuss the post-quantum Diffie-Hellman key exchange and private key exchange protocols.
We present a novel one-way quantum key distribution protocol based on 3-dimensional quantum state, a qutrit, that encodes two qubits in its 2-dimensional subspaces. The qubits hold the classical bit information that has to be shared between…
A quantum cryptographic protocol based in public key cryptography combinations and private key cryptography is presented. Unlike the BB84 protocol [1] and its many variants [2,3] two quantum channels are used. The present research does not…
Security against simple eavesdropping attacks is demonstrated for a recently proposed quantum key distribution protocol which uses the Fibonacci recursion relation to enable high-capacity key generation with entangled photon pairs. No…
The ability to distribute secret keys between two parties with information-theoretic security, that is, regardless of the capacities of a malevolent eavesdropper, is one of the most celebrated results in the field of quantum information…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no…
We consider the security of the BB84, six-state and SARG04 quantum key distribution protocols when the eavesdropper doesn't have access to a quantum memory. In this case, Eve's most general strategy is to measure her ancilla with an…
In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an…