Related papers: Extended Pair Approximation of Evolutionary Game o…
This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-updating. Analytical conjectures using pair…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…
We study the interplay between evolutionary game and network structure and show how the dynamics of the game affect the growth pattern of the network and how the evolution of the network influence the cooperative behavior in the game.…
In this paper, we consider a simple stochastic epidemic model on large regular random graphs and the stochastic process that corresponds to this dynamics in the standard pair approximation. Using the fact that the nodes of a pair are…
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…
The replicator equation is one of the fundamental tools to study evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed populations. This paper contributes to the literature on evolutionary graph theory, providing a version of the replicator equation for a…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
The goal of is to study how increased variability in the degree distribution impacts the global connectivity properties of a large network. We approach this question by modeling the network as a uniform random graph with a given degree…
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games…
Previous studies have shown that the topological properties of a complex network, such as heterogeneity and average degree, affect the evolutionary game dynamics on it. However, traditional numerical simulations are usually time-consuming…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…