Related papers: Substitute Valuations: Generation and Structure
How do we assign value to economic transactions? To answer this question, we must consider whether the value of objects is inherent, is a product of social interaction, or involves other mechanisms. Economic theory predicts that there is an…
Many random combinatorial objects have a component structure whose joint distribution is equal to that of a process of mutually independent random variables, conditioned on the value of a weighted sum of the variables. It is interesting to…
$\lambda\upsilon$ is an extension of the $\lambda$-calculus which internalises the calculus of substitutions. In the current paper, we investigate the combinatorial properties of $\lambda\upsilon$ focusing on the quantitative aspects of…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
We study the correlated equilibrium polytope $P_G$ of a game $G$ from a combinatorial point of view. We introduce the region of full-dimensionality for this class of polytopes and prove that it is a semialgebraic set for any game. Using a…
A common theme of enumerative combinatorics is formed by counting functions that are polynomials evaluated at positive integers. In this expository paper, we focus on four families of such counting functions connected to hyperplane…
After experimentation with other designs, the major search engines converged on the weighted, generalized second-price auction (wGSP) for selling keyword advertisements. Notably, this convergence occurred before position auctions were well…
We consider combinatorial optimization problems defined over random ensembles, and study how solution cost increases when the optimal solution undergoes a small perturbation delta. For the minimum spanning tree, the increase in cost scales…
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…
We consider a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, where the sellers run locally independent Progressive Second-Price (PSP) auctions, and buyers may participate in multiple auctions, forming a multi-auction market with perfect…
In this paper we suggest a new algorithm for the computation of a best rank one approximation of tensors, called alternating singular value decomposition. This method is based on the computation of maximal singular values and the…
Finding optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions is a hard problem and finding approximations to the optimal solution is also hard. We investigate the use of Branch-and-Bound techniques: they require both a way to bound from…
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many…
One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial…
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in…
Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…
This paper develops new combinatorial approaches to analyze and compute special set partitions, called complementary set partitions, which are fundamental in the study of generalized cumulants. Moving away from traditional graph-based and…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
Estimation is the computational task of recovering a hidden parameter $x$ associated with a distribution $D_x$, given a measurement $y$ sampled from the distribution. High dimensional estimation problems arise naturally in statistics,…
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly…