Related papers: Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperat…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
We generalize the notion of convexity and average-convexity to the notion of weighted average-convexity. We show several results on the relation between weighted average-convexity and cooperative games. First, we prove that if a game is…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…
We investigate the application of the Shapley value to quantifying the contribution of a tuple to a query answer. The Shapley value is a widely known numerical measure in cooperative game theory and in many applications of game theory for…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Cooperative games are an important class of problems in game theory, where the goal is to distribute a value among a set of players who are allowed to cooperate by forming coalitions. An outcome of the game is given by an allocation vector…
Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…
The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of…
In this paper the Shapley value of digraph (directed graph) games are considered. Digraph games are transferable utility (TU) games with limited cooperation among players, where players are represented by nodes. A restrictive relation…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…
In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by…