Related papers: A simple evolutionary game with feedback between p…

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

A minority game whose strategies are given by probabilities p, is replaced by a 'simplified' version that makes no use of memories at all. Numerical results show that the corresponding distribution functions are indistinguishable. A related…

Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…

We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. In games under delayed control both players suffer from partial informedness due to symmetrically delayed…

We study a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where a large number of individuals choose the game they want to play by voting. We show that it can be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…

Game balancing is an important part of the (computer) game design process, in which designers adapt a game prototype so that the resulting gameplay is as entertaining as possible. In industry, the evaluation of a game is often based on…

In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents.…

We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…

Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…

We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares their payoff to q neighbours, rather than a single neighbour as in standard evolutionary game theory. Through studying fixed point stability and fixation times…

We define the class of "simple recursive games". A simple recursive game is defined as a simple stochastic game (a notion due to Anne Condon), except that we allow arbitrary real payoffs but disallow moves of chance. We study the complexity…

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…

We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…

In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…

While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the…

The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…