Related papers: On the Security of the Ping-Pong Protocol
It is claimed in Phys. Lett. A by T. Nishioka et. al. 327 (2004) 28-32, that the security of Y-00 is equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher. In this paper it is shown that the claim is false in either the use of Y-00 for direct…
Experimental Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have to consist of not only the unconditionally secure quantum transmission, but also a subsequent classical exchange that enables key reconciliation and error correction. There is a…
Quantum technologies hold the promise of not only faster algorithmic processing of data, via quantum computation, but also of more secure communications, in the form of quantum cryptography. In recent years, a number of protocols have…
Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 73}, 042305 (2006)] are recently proposed by Lee, Lim and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be…
We present a quantum communication protocol which keeps all the properties of the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] but improves the capacity doubly as the ping-pong protocol. Alice and Bob can use the variable…
We show that the revised KKKP protocol proposed by Kye and Kim [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,040501(2005)] is still insecure with coherent states by a type of beamsplitting attack. We then further revise the KKKP protocol so that it is secure under…
Recently, a quantum multi-party summation protocol based on the quantum Fourier transform has been proposed [Quantum Inf Process 17: 129, 2018]. The protocol claims to be secure against both outside and participant attacks. However, a…
This is a comment on PRL90(03)157901 by Antoni Wojcik (quant-ph/0211199)
We prove the security of a high-capacity quantum key distribution protocol over noisy channels. By using entanglement purification protocol, we construct a modified version of the protocol in which we separate it into two consecutive…
We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in [Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully…
Secure multi-party computing, also called "secure function evaluation", has been extensively studied in classical cryptography. We consider the extension of this task to computation with quantum inputs and circuits. Our protocols are…
It is of folkloric belief that the security of classical cryptographic protocols is automatically broken if the Adversary is allowed to perform superposition queries and the honest players forced to perform actions coherently on quantum…
The rise of quantum computers exposes vulnerabilities in current public key cryptographic protocols, necessitating the development of secure post-quantum (PQ) schemes. Hence, we conduct a comprehensive study on various PQ approaches,…
In this survey we propose to cover the prose of post-quantum cryptography over classical cryptography. We talk about the various cryptographic methods that are being practiced to safeguard our information. The future of secure communication…
We consider testing the ability of quantum network nodes to execute multi-round quantum protocols. Specifically, we examine protocols in which the nodes are capable of performing quantum gates, storing qubits and exchanging said qubits over…
An overview on current developments in post quantum cryptography
The security issues facing quantum key distribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in nature and not those based on physics. The problem of security criteria is…
In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
The previous work showed that the Y00 protocol could stay secure with the eavesdropper's guessing probability on the secret keys being strictly less than one under an unlimitedly long known-plaintext attack with quantum memory. However, an…