Related papers: Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitra…
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…
We extend the Fundamental Theorem of Epistemic Game Theory to games with Baire class one payoffs and locally compact Polish strategy spaces, and under Projective Determinacy, to games with analytically measurable payoffs and arbitrary…
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players…
Strategy iteration is a technique frequently used for two-player games in order to determine the winner or compute payoffs, but to the best of our knowledge no general framework for strategy iteration has been considered. Inspired by…
The paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies. The language also provides a natural way to represent what agents would know were they to be aware of the strategies being used by…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…
We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
We introduce the notions of weakly *-concave and weakly naturally quasi-concave correspondence and prove fixed point theorems and continuous selection theorems for these kind of correspondences. As applications in the game theory, by using…
This paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works with systems whose states explicitly encode…
Candogan et al. (2011) provide an orthogonal direct-sum decomposition of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. In this paper we study the issue of decomposing games that are strategically equivalent from a…
Two natural strategy elimination procedures have been studied for strategic games. The first one involves the notion of (strict, weak, etc) dominance and the second the notion of rationalizability. In the case of dominance the criterion of…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
Past efforts to classify impartial three-player combinatorial games (the theories of Li and Straffin) have made various restrictive assumptions about the rationality of one's opponents and the formation and behavior of coalitions. One may…