Related papers: Quantum Auctions
Overcoming the influence of noise and imperfections is a major challenge in quantum computing. Here, we present an approach based on applying a desired unitary computation in superposition between the system of interest and some auxiliary…
The superposition principle provides us the opportunity to unfold many surprising facts. One such fact leads to the generation of entanglement which may allow one to teleport an unknown quantum state from one location to another. We try to…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
Sharing correlated random variables is a resource for a number of information theoretic tasks such as privacy amplification, simultaneous message passing, secret sharing and many more. In this article, we show that to establish such a…
The final goal of quantum hypothesis testing is to achieve quantum advantage over all possible classical strategies. In the protocol of quantum reading this advantage is achieved for information retrieval from an optical memory, whose…
In a variant of communication complexity tasks, two or more separated parties cooperate to compute a function of their local data, using a limited amount of communication. It is known that communication of quantum systems and shared…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset of these…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…
Quantum correlations between parts of a composite system most clearly reveal themselves through entanglement. Designing, maintaining, and controlling entangled systems is very demanding, which raises the stakes for understanding the…
We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder's valuations, the bidder's ex ante expected surplus, and the…
Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial…
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…
Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the…
The growing demand for data and AI-generated digital goods, such as personalized written content and artwork, necessitates effective pricing and feedback mechanisms that account for uncertain utility and costly production. Motivated by…
In auction theory, cryptography has been used to achieve anonymity of the participants, security and privacy of the bids, secure computation and to simulate mediator (auctioneer). Auction theory focuses on revenue and Cryptography focuses…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
We present an efficient way for measuring the entanglement of the atoms. Through the auxiliary single photons input-output process in cavity quantum electrodynamics (QED), the concurrence of the atomic entanglement can be obtained according…
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing…