Related papers: Quantum Auctions
Online auction is a cornerstone of e-commerce, and a key challenge is designing incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize expected revenue. Existing approaches often assume known bidder value distributions and fixed sets of bidders and…
A method to hide certain quantum states in a superposition will be proposed. Such method can be used to increase the security of a communication channel. States represent an encrypted message will disappear during data exchange. This makes…
Understanding the role that quantum entanglement plays as a resource in various information processing tasks is one of the crucial goals of quantum information theory. Here we propose a new perspective for studying quantum entanglement:…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
Quantum games, like quantum algorithms, exploit quantum entanglement to establish strong correlations between strategic player actions. This paper introduces quantum game-theoretic models applied to trading and demonstrates their…
A traditionally desired goal when designing auction mechanisms is incentive compatibility, i.e., ensuring that bidders fare best by truthfully reporting their preferences. A complementary goal, which has, thus far, received significantly…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…
Bid leakage is a corrupt scheme in a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the procurer leaks the opponents' bids to a favoured participant. The rational behaviour of such participant is to bid close to the deadline in order to receive…
A quantum protocol is described which enables a user to send sealed messages and that allows for the detection of active eavesdroppers. We examine a class of eavesdropping strategies, those that make use of quantum operations, and we…
We formulate quantum computing solutions to a large class of dynamic nonlinear asset pricing models using algorithms, in theory exponentially more efficient than classical ones, which leverage the quantum properties of superposition and…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
This paper presents a bidding system for sponsored search auctions under an unknown valuation model. This formulation assumes that the bidder's value is unknown, evolving arbitrarily, and observed only upon winning an auction. Unlike…
Anonymous voting is a voting method of hiding the link between a vote and a voter, the context of which ranges from governmental elections to decision making in small groups like councils or companies. In this paper, we propose a quantum…
This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity, volume, variety, and…
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security…