Eilon Solan

In many institutional settings, $k$ items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose…

Consider the following process whereby $n$ balls are distributed into $k$ bins. Repeatedly, a ball is removed from a non-empty bin chosen uniformly at random. The process ends when a single non-empty bin remains. Will Ma…

We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…

We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…

An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single nonabsorbing state. Such a game is called recursive if all players receive a payoff of 0 in the nonabsorbing state, and positive if all payoffs in absorbing states are positive. An action…

We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of…

We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

In this note, we propose an alternative definition of strategies and histories in opportunity hunting games, as introduced in Eilat, Neeman and Solan (2025). The advantage of the formulation presented here is that it encompasses a broader…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…

Consider a dynamic decision-making scenario where at every stage the investor has to choose between investing in one of two projects or gathering more information. At each stage, the investor may seek counsel from one of several…

We are given a bounded Borel-measurable real-valued function on a product of countably many Polish spaces, and a product probability measure. We are interested in points in the product space that can be used to approximate the expected…

A group of players are supposed to follow a prescribed profile of strategies. If they follow this profile, they will reach a given target. We show that if the target is not reached because some player deviates, then an outside observer can…

We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…

We study a game where one player selects a random function, and the other has to guess that function, and show that with high probability the second player can correctly guess most of the random function. We apply this analysis to…

A parametric version of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, which is proven using the fixed-point index, states that for every continuous mapping $f : (X \times Y) \to Y$, where $X$ is nonempty, compact, and connected subset of a Hausdorff…

This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with…

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…

It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon>0$. Their proof…