Yield Uncertainty and Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks
Abstract
How does supply uncertainty affect the structure of supply chain networks? To answer this question we consider a setting where retailers and suppliers must establish a costly relationship with each other prior to engaging in trade. Suppliers, with uncertain yield, announce wholesale prices, while retailers must decide which suppliers to link to based on their wholesale prices. Subsequently, retailers compete with each other in Cournot fashion to sell the acquired supply to consumers. We find that in equilibrium retailers concentrate their links among too few suppliers, i.e., there is insufficient diversification of the supply base. We find that either reduction of supply variance or increase of mean supply, increases a supplier's profit. However, these two ways of improving service have qualitatively different effects on welfare: improvement of the expected supply by a supplier makes everyone better off, whereas improvement of supply variance lowers consumer surplus.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1907.09943,
title = {Yield Uncertainty and Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks},
author = {Victor Amelkin and Rakesh Vohra},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.09943},
year = {2023}
}