When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers
Theoretical Economics
2024-08-05 v5
Abstract
We study the problem of when to sell an indivisible object. There is a monopolistic seller who owns an indivisible object and plans to sell it over a given span of time to the set of potential buyers whose valuations for the object evolve over time. We formulate the seller's problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. We provide a procedure for finding the optimal solution and show how to check incentive compatibility. We also discuss the threshold rule from the perspective of optimal stopping.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2105.07649,
title = {When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers},
author = {Kiho Yoon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.07649},
year = {2024}
}