LLM agents often rely on Skills to describe available tools and recommended procedures. We study a hidden-comment prompt injection risk in this documentation layer: when a Markdown Skill is rendered to HTML, HTML comment blocks can become invisible to human reviewers, yet the raw text may still be supplied verbatim to the model. In experiments, we find that DeepSeek-V3.2 and GLM-4.5-Air can be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in a hidden comment appended to an otherwise legitimate Skill, yielding outputs that contain sensitive tool intentions. A short defensive system prompt that treats Skills as untrusted and forbids sensitive actions prevents these malicious tool calls and instead surfaces the suspicious hidden instructions.
@article{arxiv.2602.10498,
title = {When Skills Lie: Hidden-Comment Injection in LLM Agents},
author = {Qianli Wang and Boyang Ma and Minghui Xu and Yue Zhang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.10498},
year = {2026}
}