Value Maximization under Stochastic Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

We investigate a value-maximizing problem incorporating a human behavior pattern: present-biased-ness, for a firm which navigates strategic decisions encompassing earning retention/payout and capital injection policies, within the framework of L\'evy processes. We employ the concept of stochastic quasi-hyperbolic discounting to capture the present-biased inclinations and model decision making as an intra-personal game with sophisticated decision-makers. Our analysis yields closed-form solutions, revealing that double-barrier strategies constitute Markov equilibrium strategies. Our findings reveal that firms, influenced by present-biased-ness, initiate dividend payments sooner, diminishing overall value compared to scenarios without present-biased-ness (under exponential discounting). We also discuss bailout optimality, providing necessary and sufficient conditions. The impact of behavioral issues is examined in the Brownian motion and jump diffusion cases.