URDP: General Framework for Direct CCA2 Security from any Lattice-Based PKE Scheme
Abstract
Design efficient lattice-based cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is a challenge problem. To the date, full CCA2-security of all proposed lattice-based PKE schemes achieved by using a generic transformations such as either strongly unforgeable one-time signature schemes (SU-OT-SS), or a message authentication code (MAC) and weak form of commitment. The drawback of these schemes is that encryption requires "separate encryption". Therefore, the resulting encryption scheme is not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice and it is inappropriate for many applications such as small ubiquitous computing devices with limited resources such as smart cards, active RFID tags, wireless sensor networks and other embedded devices. In this work, for the first time, we introduce an efficient universal random data padding (URDP) scheme, and show how it can be used to construct a "direct" CCA2-secure encryption scheme from "any" worst-case hardness problems in (ideal) lattice in the standard model, resolving a problem that has remained open till date. This novel approach is a "black-box" construction and leads to the elimination of separate encryption, as it avoids using general transformation from CPA-secure scheme to a CCA2-secure one. IND-CCA2 security of this scheme can be tightly reduced in the standard model to the assumption that the underlying primitive is an one-way trapdoor function.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1302.6352,
title = {URDP: General Framework for Direct CCA2 Security from any Lattice-Based PKE Scheme},
author = {Roohallah Rastaghi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1302.6352},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1302.0347, arXiv:1211.6984; and with arXiv:1205.5224 by other authors