To address known privacy problems with the EMV standard, EMVCo have proposed a Blinded Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol, which is intended to be part of a future 2nd Gen EMV protocol. We point out that active attackers were not previously accounted for in the privacy requirements of this proposal protocol, and demonstrate that an active attacker can compromise unlinkability within a distance of 100cm. Here, we adopt a strong definition of unlinkability that does account for active attackers and propose an enhancement of the protocol proposed by EMVCo. We prove that our protocol does satisfy strong unlinkability, while preserving authentication.
@article{arxiv.2105.02029,
title = {Unlinkability of an Improved Key Agreement Protocol for EMV 2nd Gen Payments},
author = {Ross Horne and Sjouke Mauw and Semen Yurkov},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.02029},
year = {2022}
}