English

Ultra valuations

Computer Science and Game Theory 2018-09-25 v4

Abstract

This paper proposes an original exchange property of valuations.This property is shown to be equivalent to a property described by Dress and Terhalle in the context of discrete optimization and matroids and shown there to characterize the valuations for which the demand oracle can be implemented by a greedy algorithm. The same exchange property is also equivalent to a property described independently by Reijnierse, van Gellekom and Potters and by Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan and shown there to be satisfied by substitutes valuations. It studies the family of valuations that satisfy this exchange property, the ultra valuations. Any substitutes valuation is an ultra valuation, but ultra valuations may exhibit complementarities. Any symmetric valuation is an ultra valuation. Substitutes valuations are exactly the submodular ultra valuations. Ultra valuations define ultrametrics on the set of items. The maximum of an ultra valuation on nn items can be found in O(n2)O(n^2) steps. Finding an efficient allocation among ultra valuations is NP-hard.

Cite

@article{arxiv.1712.04236,
  title  = {Ultra valuations},
  author = {Daniel Lehmann},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04236},
  year   = {2018}
}

Comments

31 pages, preprint. This is a fourth version. The first version has been enlarged and much improved. The relation to extant work and the overall presentation are much improved. Some new results are included. The fourth version has a better comparison with the choice-language properties and an added appendix on the topic

R2 v1 2026-06-22T23:15:26.358Z