Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) depend on untrusted software components to automate dangerous or critical missions, making them a desirable target for attacks. Some work has been done to prevent an attacker who has either compromised a ground control station or parts of a UAV's software from sabotaging the vehicle, but not both. We present an architecture running a UAV software stack with runtime monitoring and seL4-based software isolation that prevents attackers from both exploiting software bugs and stealthy attacks. Our architecture retrofits legacy UAVs and secures the popular MAVLink protocol, making wide adoption possible.
@article{arxiv.2503.17298,
title = {UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks},
author = {Arthur Amorim and Max Taylor and Trevor Kann and Gary T. Leavens and William L. Harrison and Lance Joneckis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.17298},
year = {2025}
}