Quantum clock synchronization underpins modern secure communications and critical infrastructure, yet its fundamental dependence on channel reciprocity introduces an exploitable vulnerability to asymmetric delay attacks. Current attack strategies rely on static delays, limiting their ability to target application-specific stability requirements. Here, we propose a tunable asymmetric delay attack (T-ADA) that dynamically controls delay parameters to induce manipulate synchronization accuracy. Through experimental implementation, we demonstrate how tailored attack trajectories can selectively compromise system stability across different scenarios. This work uncovers key vulnerabilities in synchronization protocols under customizable attacks and provide a foundation for developing secure and resilient quantum clock synchronization systems.
@article{arxiv.2510.21101,
title = {Tunable Asymmetric Delay Attack in Quantum Clock Synchronization},
author = {Hui Han and Haotian Teng and Hailong Xu and Jinquan Huang and Yuanmei Xie and Yichen Zhang and Bo Liu and Wanrong Yu and Baokang Zhao and Shuhui Chen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.21101},
year = {2025}
}