TulaFale: A Security Tool for Web Services
Abstract
Web services security specifications are typically expressed as a mixture of XML schemas, example messages, and narrative explanations. We propose a new specification language for writing complementary machine-checkable descriptions of SOAP-based security protocols and their properties. Our TulaFale language is based on the pi calculus (for writing collections of SOAP processors running in parallel), plus XML syntax (to express SOAP messaging), logical predicates (to construct and filter SOAP messages), and correspondence assertions (to specify authentication goals of protocols). Our implementation compiles TulaFale into the applied pi calculus, and then runs Blanchet's resolution-based protocol verifier. Hence, we can automatically verify authentication properties of SOAP protocols.
Cite
@article{arxiv.cs/0412044,
title = {TulaFale: A Security Tool for Web Services},
author = {Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Cedric Fournet and Andrew D. Gordon and Riccardo Pucella},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cs/0412044},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
26 pages, 4 figures. Appears in Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Formal Methods for Components and Objects (FMCS'03), LNCS 3188, pp. 197-222