Truthfulness via Proxies
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-03-17 v2
Abstract
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation O(loglogmlogm)-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1011.3232,
title = {Truthfulness via Proxies},
author = {Shahar Dobzinski and Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1011.3232},
year = {2015}
}
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