Clean-label poisoning attacks inject innocuous looking (and "correctly" labeled) poison images into training data, causing a model to misclassify a targeted image after being trained on this data. We consider transferable poisoning attacks that succeed without access to the victim network's outputs, architecture, or (in some cases) training data. To achieve this, we propose a new "polytope attack" in which poison images are designed to surround the targeted image in feature space. We also demonstrate that using Dropout during poison creation helps to enhance transferability of this attack. We achieve transferable attack success rates of over 50% while poisoning only 1% of the training set.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1905.05897,
title = {Transferable Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Deep Neural Nets},
author = {Chen Zhu and W. Ronny Huang and Ali Shafahi and Hengduo Li and Gavin Taylor and Christoph Studer and Tom Goldstein},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.05897},
year = {2019}
}