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Towards Strong Certified Defense with Universal Asymmetric Randomization

Machine Learning 2025-10-24 v1 Cryptography and Security

Abstract

Randomized smoothing has become essential for achieving certified adversarial robustness in machine learning models. However, current methods primarily use isotropic noise distributions that are uniform across all data dimensions, such as image pixels, limiting the effectiveness of robustness certification by ignoring the heterogeneity of inputs and data dimensions. To address this limitation, we propose UCAN: a novel technique that \underline{U}niversally \underline{C}ertifies adversarial robustness with \underline{A}nisotropic \underline{N}oise. UCAN is designed to enhance any existing randomized smoothing method, transforming it from symmetric (isotropic) to asymmetric (anisotropic) noise distributions, thereby offering a more tailored defense against adversarial attacks. Our theoretical framework is versatile, supporting a wide array of noise distributions for certified robustness in different p\ell_p-norms and applicable to any arbitrary classifier by guaranteeing the classifier's prediction over perturbed inputs with provable robustness bounds through tailored noise injection. Additionally, we develop a novel framework equipped with three exemplary noise parameter generators (NPGs) to optimally fine-tune the anisotropic noise parameters for different data dimensions, allowing for pursuing different levels of robustness enhancements in practice.Empirical evaluations underscore the significant leap in UCAN's performance over existing state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating up to 182.6%182.6\% improvement in certified accuracy at large certified radii on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets.\footnote{Code is anonymously available at \href{https://github.com/youbin2014/UCAN/}{https://github.com/youbin2014/UCAN/}}

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2510.19977,
  title  = {Towards Strong Certified Defense with Universal Asymmetric Randomization},
  author = {Hanbin Hong and Ashish Kundu and Ali Payani and Binghui Wang and Yuan Hong},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.19977},
  year   = {2025}
}

Comments

Accepted by CSF 2026, 39th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

R2 v1 2026-07-01T07:00:41.747Z