Towards a Lightweight Continuous Authentication Protocol for Device-to-Device Communication
Abstract
Continuous Authentication (CA) has been proposed as a potential solution to counter complex cybersecurity attacks that exploit conventional static authentication mechanisms that authenticate users only at an ingress point. However, widely researched human user characteristics-based CA mechanisms cannot be extended to continuously authenticate Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The challenges are exacerbated with increased adoption of device-to-device (d2d) communication in critical infrastructures. Existing d2d authentication protocols proposed in the literature are either prone to subversion or are computationally infeasible to be deployed on constrained IoT devices. In view of these challenges, we propose a novel, lightweight, and secure CA protocol that leverages communication channel properties and a tunable mathematical function to generate dynamically changing session keys. Our preliminary informal protocol analysis suggests that the proposed protocol is resistant to known attack vectors and thus has strong potential for deployment in securing critical and resource-constrained d2d communication.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2010.05144,
title = {Towards a Lightweight Continuous Authentication Protocol for Device-to-Device Communication},
author = {Syed W. Shah and Naeem F. Syed and Arash Shaghaghi and Adnan Anwar and Zubair Baig and Robin Doss},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.05144},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
This is a copy of the accepted version at The 19th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom 2020) [Core Rank: A]