Tor is not enough: Coercion in Remote Electronic Voting Systems
Cryptography and Security
2017-02-10 v1
Abstract
Current electronic voting systems require an anonymous channel during the voting phase to prevent coercion. Typically, low-latency anonymization-networks like Tor are used for this purpose. In this paper we devise a monitoring attack that allows an attacker to monitor whether participants of an election voted, despite the use of a low-latency network during the voting phase, thereby breaking an important part of coercion-freeness. We implement a simulation carrying out our attack and measure its success rates.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1702.02816,
title = {Tor is not enough: Coercion in Remote Electronic Voting Systems},
author = {Christian Meter and Alexander Schneider and Philipp Hagemeister and Martin Mauve},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.02816},
year = {2017}
}