The value of Side Information in Secondary Spectrum Markets
Abstract
In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the availability of unused channels of its competitors. We consider a model were a primary can acquire its competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We first characterize the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also show that surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1602.01154,
title = {The value of Side Information in Secondary Spectrum Markets},
author = {Arnob Ghosh and Saswati Sarkar and Randall Berry},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.01154},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
Shorter version will be presented in ISIT'16. Submitted to JSAC Special Issue on Spectrum Sharing, 2016. Impacts of Estimation errors, different C-CSI acquisition costs and different availabilities are now considered