The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions
Theoretical Economics
2020-07-01 v6
Abstract
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1808.07924,
title = {The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions},
author = {Jan Christoph Schlegel},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.07924},
year = {2020}
}