Stability analysis and control of decision-making of miners in blockchain
Abstract
To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for miners using an evolutionary game approach and analyze the stability of equilibrium points of the proposed model. The proposed model is described by the 1st-order differential equation. So, it is simple but its theoretical analysis gives an insight into the characteristics of the decision-making. Through the analysis of the equilibrium points, we show the transcritical bifurcations and hysteresis phenomena of the equilibrium points. We also design a controller that determines the mining reward based on the number of participating miners to stabilize the state that all miners participate in the mining. Numerical simulation shows that there is a trade-off in the choice of the design parameters.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2104.08460,
title = {Stability analysis and control of decision-making of miners in blockchain},
author = {Kosuke Toda and Naomi Kuze and Toshimitsu Ushio},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.08460},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
8 pages, 4 figures, accepted to a journal